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The Role of the Judiciary When the Agency 
Confirmation Process Stalls:  
Thoughts on the Two-Member NLRB and the Questions 
the Supreme Court Should Have, But Didn’t, Address 
in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB 
                  Catherine L. Fisk*       
I.    INTRODUCTION 
The National Labor Relations Board, by statute, has five members 
who serve staggered five-year terms.1  It operated with two of the five 
members from January 1, 2008 to March 27, 2010 because the Senate did 
not confirm nominees to replace three members whose terms expired.2  
President Obama made recess appointments to the Board effective March 
27, 2010, and the delegation expired.3  In dozens of cases, employers     
resisting compliance with Board orders challenged the validity of the 
NLRB’s decisions on the ground that the Board lacks the authority to act 
with only two members.4  Five courts of appeals held the Board has power 
to act with two members.5  The D.C. Circuit held that it does not.6  The  
                                                                                                                           
 * Catherine L. Fisk is Chancellor’s Professor of Law at University of California, Irvine.  Profes-
sor Fisk is grateful to Deborah Malamud, William Gould, and participants at the Florida International 
University College of Law symposium on the 75th anniversary of the National Labor Relations Act for 
discussing the ideas contained here and to Christina Tsou and Jackie Woodbridge for research assis-
tance.  The author claims responsibility for errors. 
 1 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). 
 2 See Talk about Recess Appointments Follows Senate’s Defeat of Cloture Motion on Becker, 30 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-10 (Feb. 17, 2010).  
 3 Letter Brief from Elena Kagan, Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, to William K. 
Suter, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 26, 2010) at 1 (on file with the Supreme Court of 
the United States).  
 4 As of November 2009, the two-member Board’s authority had been challenged in approximate-
ly 77 cases pending in the courts of appeals.  See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 6 n.7, 
New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010) (citing “We’re Poised for 
Changes” in Labor Law, Chairman Liebman Says at ABA Conference, (volume #?) Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA). at C-3 (Nov. 12, 2009)). 
 5 Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2009); Snell Island SNF LLC v. 
NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 424 (2d Cir. 2009); Narricot Indus., L.P. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654, 660 (4th Cir. 
2009); New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 845-46 (7th Cir. 2009); Teamsters Local Union 
No. 523 v. NLRB, 590 F.3d 849, 852 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 6 Laurel Baye Healthcare by Lanier v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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Supreme Court divided 5 to 4 and held that it did not, though on slightly 
different reasons than the D.C. Circuit.7 
The underlying politics of the issue reflect the labor-management split, 
as does so much of contemporary labor law.  Generally, labor was on the 
side of upholding the power of the two-member Board and management 
was on the side of invalidating it.  At the Supreme Court, the four most con-
servative Justices took the management side, three of the four most liberal 
took the labor side.  Kennedy sided with the liberals and Stevens sided with 
the conservatives. Other than Stevens’ position, the political orientation of 
those on both sides of the issue was not surprising, because most of the 
nearly 600 decisions rendered by the two-member Board8 involved unfair 
labor practices committed by employers.9  Because employers have the 
option of going to court to seek remedies for the most substantial harms that 
unions can inflict on them (secondary boycotts),10 much of the work of the 
Board (although certainly not all of it) consists of unfair labor practice cases 
brought by employees or unions against employers and in representation 
proceedings in which the union is seeking recognition. 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court, like 
that of all six circuit courts, focused on the language of the statute, which 
consists of four separate clauses governing the power of the Board       
members to delegate their authority to subgroups of the members, the    
quorum, and the effect of vacancies.  The difference of opinion was whether 
the quorum requirement trumps the others, or whether an exception trumps 
the quorum requirement.  Four members of the Board, the Office of Legal 
Counsel, and five courts of appeals sided with the dissent.  A contrary   
reading by the five Justices in the majority and one court of appeals carried 
the day.  Quite frankly, I think it’s close to preposterous to pretend that the 
language of the statute by itself can resolve the debate.  The whole episode 
illustrates the trouble with plain language interpretations of the statute: in 
this case, as the Court majority admitted, the various readings of the statute 
offered by the majority, the dissent, and the courts of appeals are “textually 
permissible,” and the difference among them really is over which reading is 
most “plausible,” which requires a form of functional and policy analysis 
that is conspicuously absent in the cases.11 
                                                                                                                           
 7 New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010).   
 8 See id. at 3 (citing an April 2010 letter brief from the Solicitor General to the U.S. Supreme 
Court reporting that during the period in which the Board had only two members, it decided almost 600 
cases). 
 9 See Annual Report of NLRB. 
 10 29 U.S.C. § 187 (2010). 
 11 New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, slip op. at 3 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also infra text 
accompanying note 4. 
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Finding the statutory language, the legislative history and Chevron 
deference insufficient to answer the question, this article explores what 
courts should do when a failure to nominate or confirm replacements 
threatens to render an agency incapable of enforcing the law.  An enduring 
question is what role courts should play when the nomination and confirma-
tion process threatens to prevent an agency from acting at all.  This is a 
pressing issue across the administrative state, as the number of vacancies in 
federal agencies is very substantial.12  The Supreme Court did not address 
this issue, but the real question – and it is a hard question – concerns the 
role of courts in intervening to keep agencies functioning when the nomina-
tion process fails.  Parsing the language of the statute, as the Court did, does 
not answer the question.  But until the Court is prepared to offer a thought-
ful analysis of the role of the judiciary in instances of administrative law 
melt-down, we will have to wait for answers to the real questions at stake in 
the case. 
II.  THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT  
A. Background 
The Wagner Act created the NLRB with three members in 1935.13  In 
1947, the Taft-Hartley Act expanded the membership of the Board to five.14   
The 1935 Act provided that two members of the Board constituted a    
quorum, and allowed the Board to delegate its authority to two members to 
act.15  Between 1935 and 1947, during three separate periods when the 
Board had a vacancy, the two remaining members issued a total of 466   
decisions.16  When the membership of the Board was expanded in 1947, the 
quorum was increased to three, but the statute stated that the Board was 
authorized to delegate “any or all” of its authority “to any group of three or 
more members,” two members of which would constitute a quorum.17  That 
provision remains in the statute today, and the Board decides a very sub-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 913 (2009) (describing the increasing length of vacancies of agency positions). 
 13 Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 3(a)-(b), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 
(2006)).  
 14 Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 3(a), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 
167, 171-175, 175(a), 176-183, 185-187). 
 15 Wagner Act § 3(b). 
 16 Between August 27 and October 11, 1941, the Board had only two members and issued 224 
decisions.  Between August 27 and November 26, 1940, the Board had only two members and issued 
239 decisions.  And between August 31 and September 23, 1936, the Board had only two members and 
issued 3 decisions.  See Snell Island SNF LLC, 568 F.3d at 422 (quoting Brief of NLRB at 16-17 n.8). 
 17 Taft-Hartley Act, § 3(b). 
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stantial number of its cases through three-member panels.18  The Court held 
in New Process Steel that although the full Board can delegate its powers to 
three members under the first sentence and two members can exercise the 
delegated powers to two under the last clause of the second sentence, the 
power of two members to decide expires when one of the delegee group 
leaves the Board.19 
The NLRB, of course, is not alone in facing problems associated with 
the agency being potentially unable to act because the terms of members 
have expired and the number of remaining members has become less than a 
majority of the total number of statutorily authorized memberships.  Indeed, 
the NLRB’s membership, vacancy, and quorum provisions are typical of 
those of other agencies commonly denominated as “independent.”20  The 
NLRB, like many independent agencies, has an odd number of members 
who serve fixed, staggered terms such that the term of a member is longer 
than the term of the president.21  It has been said that “[t]his organizational 
structure is intended to dilute the effect of transitory political events on 
agency policy, which underscores the agencies’ independent role.”22  Some 
statutes require political balance,23 whereas others (including the NLRB) 
have adopted political balance as a matter of tradition even though it is not 
statutorily mandated.24   
Ever since Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission and 
provided that a vacancy shall not impair the power of the Commission to 
act, many subsequent statutes creating other agencies have contained a   
similar provision, and one exists in the NLRA.25  Agencies and reviewing 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Annual Report of NLRB. 
 19 New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, slip op. at 4, 13. 
 20 See Marshall J. Berger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1139, 1182 (2000) (describing the NLRA’s 
provisions for appointments of members and for a quorum of the agency as typical). 
 21 Id. at 1137 (describing the typical multi-member administrative agency as having, like the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, an odd number of members who serve fixed, staggered terms that 
typically extend beyond the term of the appointing president). 
 22 Id.  
 23 Id. at 1139 (“Typically, agency statutes require political balance, i.e., no more than a bare 
majority of members of multi-member agencies may come from the same political party.” (noting that 
the NLRB is an exception to this rule)). 
 24 See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (making no mention of political balance of Board membership).  
The custom is that three members reflect the president’s views on labor policy and two represent those 
of the other party.  See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221, 243-52 (2005).  Other agencies that are not statutorily required to have 
political balance are the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Review Commission.  29 U.S.C. § 661(a) (2006) (OSHRC); 30 U.S.C. § 823(a) 
(2006) (FMSHRC); see also Berger & Edles, supra note 20, at 1139. 
 25 See Breger & Edles, supra note 20, at 1135; Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 
379, 383 (1887); 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). 
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courts have generally concluded that an agency has power to continue    
acting when its membership falls, at least where the enabling statute has a 
provision like the NLRA’s providing that a vacancy shall not affect the 
power of the remaining members to act.26  The hard question is whether an 
agency can continue to act when its membership falls below the majority of 
the statutorily authorized full size.  The Securities Exchange Commission 
dealt with the risk that it would lose authority to act when its membership 
fell below the majority of five by adopting a 1995 regulation providing that 
three members constitute a quorum unless the number of members in office 
is fewer than three, in which case the quorum is the number of members in 
office.27  The Federal Trade Commission has experimented with a number 
of strategies to deal with the possibility of vacancies depriving it of the 
power to act.28  In 1976, the FTC determined that two of its statutory five 
members could issue a ruling “when three exist and are aware of the      
action,” and, more recently, adopted a rule defining a quorum as “a majority 
of the members of the commission in office and not recused from partici-
pating in the matter.”29  The justification for the new rule is the desire to 
permit the FTC to act in cases “where, due to vacancies, recusals, or a com-
bination of the two, fewer than three commissioners can participate.”30  
Even where there is no such explicit provision, courts have found that as a 
matter of sensible administration the vacancy of a majority of seats does not 
deprive the agency of the power to act.31  As the Supreme Court noted,   
federal courts of appeals delegate to three-judge panels the power to decide 
cases, and the death or retirement of one member of the three-judge panels 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See infra note 31. 
 27 17 C.F.R. § 200.41 (1999).  The D.C. Circuit upheld the power of the SEC to adopt this rule in 
Falcon Trading Group Ltd. v. SEC, 102 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1996), reasoning that the SEC was 
empowered by Congress to create its rule. 
 28 Kelly M. Falls, A Quorum of One: Redefining Recusal Standards in the Federal Trade     
Commission, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 705, 710-11 (2006). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 710. 
 31 See Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 467, 472-74 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission had the power to act even though its membership 
had fallen to five of eleven authorized positions); see also R.R. Yardmasters of Am. v. Harris, 721 F.2d 
1332, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding the power of the National Mediation Board to act with only 
one of its three members in order to prevent the complete disability of the agency because of vacancies); 
McLauglin v. Union Oil Co., 869 F.2d 1039, 1041-42 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding a provision of the 
enabling statute of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission providing that an adminis-
trative law judge’s decision goes into effect unless a commission member directs otherwise, even where 
the OSHRC had no quorum). 
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does not divest the panel of the power to act.32  But the Court reached a 
different result for the NLRA. 
B. Language of the NLRA 
As illustrated by the 5-4 split on the Supreme Court and the diversity 
of interpretations offered by the six courts of appeals to address the issue, as 
well as the opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, there are plausible inter-
pretations of the NLRA to support both that the language of section 3(b) 
does allow the two-member Board to act and that it does not.33  The First 
Circuit found it plain that it does34 (and the Seventh Circuit agreed35).  In the 
Supreme Court, the employer seeking to invalidate the work of the two-
member Board and its amici find the language plain in one direction36 and 
the United States and its amici find it plain in the other.37  The one article by 
a law professor on the issue finds the D.C. Circuit’s to be “the best plain-
meaning reading of the statute.”38  For the reasons explained below, there 
are plausible plain meaning arguments on both sides of the issue, and any 
judgment about whether one is better than another is more likely to turn on 
one’s view about the merits than on syntax. 
Section 3(b) reads:  
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more 
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise.  A    
vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining mem-
bers to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of 
the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the board, except 
that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated 
pursuant to the first sentence hereof.39 
This paragraph can be divided into four clauses:  (1) the delegation 
clause; (2) the vacancy clause; (3) the quorum clause; and (4) the exception 
                                                                                                                           
 32 New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. at 11 (June 17, 2010) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 46(b) and Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 82 (2003)).  
 33 Laurel Baye Healthcare v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Ne. Land Servs. v. 
NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 34 Ne. Land Servs., 560 F.3d at 41. 
 35 New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 845-46 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, No. 08-1457, 
slip op. at 11 (June 17, 2010). 
 36 Brief for Petitioner, New Process Steel, L.P. at 16, New Process Steel, No. 08-1457 (Dec. 23, 
2009). 
 37 Brief for National Labor Relations Board at 14, New Process Steel, No. 08-1457 (Feb. 2, 2010). 
 38 Ronald Turner, On the Authority of the Two-Member NLRB:  Statutory Interpretation Ap-
proaches and Judicial Choices, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 13, 45 (2009).  
 39 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006). 
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clause.  The difference between the majority and the dissent was in which 
clauses should be read to take primacy over the others. 
The Supreme Court majority and the D.C. Circuit found the general 
quorum clause – the second clause of the second sentence (“three members 
of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board”) – to be 
decisive.  They read the exception clause (“except that two members shall 
constitute a quorum”) to allow two members to act for the Board only when 
it has three members.40  They read the vacancy clause and the exception 
clause to be subordinate to the quorum clause.  
The Supreme Court majority offered several textual reasons for its 
conclusion.  First, to allow a group of two to act for the Board would allow 
“two members to act as the Board ad infinitum, which dramatically under-
cuts the significance of the Board quorum requirement by allowing its   
permanent circumvention.”41  To allow the Board to act indefinitely with 
only two members would, in the majority’s view, undermine the general 
principle that three is a quorum.  Second, the majority reasoned that if   
Congress had intended to allow the Board to operate with only two     
members, it would have explicitly said so.42  And, third, the vacancy clause 
means only that vacancies do not affect “the powers of the Board”; it does 
not mean that vacancies do not affect powers of a “group” delegated by the 
Board’s powers.43  This last point was the one emphasized by New Process 
Steel.  It had relied on the D.C. Circuit’s focus on the “at all times,”       
language but added a new emphasis, arguing that “the vacancy clause refers 
only  to  the  “Board”  itself  and  not  to  “any  group  of  three  or  more 
members. . . . The quorum clauses and the vacancy clause easily live in 
harmony when the vacancy clause is applied, as it is written, only to the 
Board.”44  In addition, New Process argued that the vacancy clause means 
that “[a] vacancy in a three-member group precludes any action by that 
group unless the missing member is replaced,” because the group is “no 
longer fully constituted and therefore no longer a proper delegee.”45  This 
argument places emphasis on the term “group”: a quorum of two is permis-
sible only when there is a “group” of three.  When the “group” of three who 
receives the delegation ceases to exist, then the power of the remaining two 
disappears. 
                                                                                                                           
 40 New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, slip op. at 6; Laurel Baye Healthcare v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 
472-73 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
 41 New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, slip op. at 6. 
 42 Id. at 7. 
 43 Id. at 11. 
 44 Brief for Petitioner New Process Steel, L.P. at 19-20, New Process Steel, No. 08-1457 (Dec. 23, 
2009). 
 45 Id. at 21-22, 24 n.10. 
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Finally, the majority rejected one significant part of the reading of   
section 3(b) that had been adopted by the D.C. Circuit.  The D.C. Circuit 
had concluded that the invalidity of a delegation of Board authority to a 
two-member group also applied to the Board’s delegation of authority to 
any other entity within the Board, which would cast doubt on the powers 
that the Board had delegated to the Regional Directors and General     
Counsel.  The majority rejected this reading, concluding only that the two 
members could not decide cases, and saying its holding “does not cast 
doubt on” the delegations to the Regional Directors and General Counsel.46 
In contrast, the four dissenting Justices, along with the First, Second, 
Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, as well as the Office of Legal Counsel, 
found that the language of section 3(b) leads to the opposite conclusion.  
The dissent explained that a reading of section 3(b) that allowed the agency 
to function with two members was not only the one most consistent with 
the purpose of the statute and the orderly operation of the agency but also 
was the textually preferable one. 
The dissent read the four clauses of section 3(b) as had all the circuit 
courts except the D.C. Circuit.  The delegation clause (the first sentence of 
section 3(b)) allows the Board to delegate its authority to a group of three.  
The vacancy clause says that vacancies shall not affect the power of the 
remaining members.  And the exception clause trumps the quorum clause in 
providing that two members of the Board constitute a quorum when the 
Board has delegated its authority to a group of three.47  This last point was 
the one emphasized in the briefs of the government and the AFL-CIO, as 
amicus in support of the NLRB.  As the AFL-CIO’s brief put it, “when the 
Board has delegated all of its powers to a designated three-member group 
and later vacancies reduce the Board’s complement to two of the three 
members of that designated group, those remaining members constitute a 
quorum of the group with the right unimpeded by the vacancies to exercise 
all of the delegated Board power.”48  Similarly, the Brief of the United 
States argued that “Congress has used the construction ‘at all times . . .   
except’ in a number of statutes to accomplish exactly what it did in Section 
3(b) – to provide that a general rule should apply at all times except in the 
instances specified by Congress in the statute.”49 
                                                                                                                           
 46 New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, slip op. at 9 n.4. 
 47 See id. at 9-12; see also Ne. Land Servs., Ltd., v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2009); New 
Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 846 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 48 Brief for American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5, New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, 2010 WL 581624. 
 49 Brief for Respondent at 18 & n.13, New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, 2010 WL 383618 (citing 
three statutory examples, including the 2008 Higher Education Opportunity Act, a statute governing 
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The dissent offered a Black’s Dictionary definition of the meaning of 
the term quorum to explain why the quorum clause should not be read to 
require the Board to have three members for a delegation to remain valid.  
Although the dissent did not phrase the point precisely this way, the gov-
ernment’s brief had emphasized that the ordinary meaning of the term 
quorum is the number of officers or members of a body who must partici-
pate for a body to act (a “participation floor”).50  The majority’s interpreta-
tion, which was the one offered by the employer, was that the quorum 
clause was the number of members a body must have in order for it to act (a 
“membership floor”). 
The dissent then offered a number of reasons why the quorum clause 
should not trump the vacancy clause and the exception clause.  First, the 
dissent saw no reason to read the quorum clause to allow two members to 
decide cases only when the third member was not participating because of 
recusal or illness and not when the third position was vacant.  Noting the 
practice of federal courts to allow two judges to decide a case when the 
third judge on the panel has left the court, the dissent pointed out that   
quorum rules usually govern the number of people who must be participat-
ing to decide a matter and do not govern the number of people who must be 
on the body.  Second, the dissent faulted the majority’s reading of the text 
of the vacancy clause:  “[U]nder the Court’s reading, vacancies in the Board 
will often impair the right of the remaining members to exercise the powers 
of the Board, notwithstanding the explicit statutory command to the       
contrary.”51  And, third, the majority misread the delegation clause to allow 
delegee groups to operate only so long as all members of the delegee group 
remain on the Board; in the dissent’s view, the delegation clause establishes 
only what is required for delegation (that three members vote to delegate) 
and not what happens once a vacancy occurs in the delegee group.52 
The final textual point raised by the dissent addresses the reading of 
the statute emphasized by the D.C. Circuit and offered by the employer but 
rejected by the majority in a footnote:  does the language of the quorum 
clause, stating that “at all times” a quorum of the Board is three, mean that 
none of the Board’s delegations, including to the Regional Directors and the 
General Counsel, were valid once the membership fell to two?  As the 
Fourth Circuit read the statute, the exception clause is an exception to the 
                                                                                                                           
VISTA volunteers, and a Proclamation requiring the flags of the fifty United States to be flown at the 
Washington Monument at all times except when the weather is inclement). 
 50 Brief for Respondent at 19, New Process Steel, No. 08-1457. 
 51 New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, slip op. at 6-7 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 52 Id. at 7. 
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“at all times” language on which the D.C. Circuit placed so much           
emphasis.53 
The fundamental points of disagreement between the majority’s and 
the dissent’s plain language arguments are thus two.  First: is the three-
member quorum a “participation floor” or a “membership floor”?  Second: 
does the “at all times” language apply to all of the Board’s operations, or is 
the exception clause an exception to the “at all times” language of the   
quorum clause?  The dissent read the vacancy clause and the exception 
clause to trump the three-member quorum rule.  The majority read the 
three-member quorum clause to trump the vacancy clause and the          
“exception” clause. 
C. Legislative History 
As noted above, when the Board had only three members under the 
Wagner Act, a quorum was two, and two members were authorized to con-
duct business.  When the membership of the Board was expanded to five, 
the quorum was increased to three, but the agency was authorized to dele-
gate decisionmaking to groups of three and two was sufficient to constitute 
a quorum of a delegee group.  All litigants agreed that the purpose of     
expanding the size of the Board was to enable it to sit in panels of three and 
to decide more cases.  The question is whether, in the name of increased 
productivity, the Board can continue to act when its membership falls below 
some number.  As to that, readings of the legislative history predictably 
differed.   The majority insisted that when Congress increased the member-
ship of the Board from three to five, it increased the quorum from two to 
three, and thus intended to require the Board to have three members in   
order to decide cases.54  The dissent argued that Congress intended in Taft-
Hartley to preserve the past practice under which two members of the 
Board could decide cases because it did not eliminate the provision        
allowing delegations to groups of three which, under past practice, could 
decide cases by two members when a vacancy occurred in the third        
position.55 
Litigants in the lower courts emphasized two additional provisions, 
although most of this was not discussed in the Supreme Court’s opinions.  
First, some arguments have been made about the significance of the fact 
that the Senate version of the 1947 amendment would have increased the 
size of the Board to seven, four of which would constitute a quorum, but 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Narricot Indus., L.P. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654, 659-60 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 54 New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, slip op. at 12. 
 55 Id. at 11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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that version of the bill also authorized the Board to delegate its powers “to 
any group of three or more members,” two of whom would constitute a 
quorum.  As the Second Circuit explained, this provision does not directly 
address the question whether the Board can continue to act when its mem-
bership falls to two.  The other provision of the legislative history is Senator 
Mahoney’s statement on the Senate floor opposing an override of Truman’s 
veto of the Act.  Mahoney said:   
Observe that the Board is given complete and plenary power to dele-
gate any or all of its power to any group of three; and then any two 
members of that group of three can speak for the Board.  So we have a 
bill – and I invite the attention of lawyers in this body to this – which 
not only authorizes the Board to delegate its powers, but authorizes 
the Board to delegate its powers, and all of them, to less than a     
quorum of the Board.56 
In discussing this bit of legislative history, the Second Circuit          
expressed “reluctan[ce] to draw much significance from a lone remark by a 
single senator opposing a bill.”57 
Only two of the courts of appeals discussed the legislative history.  
The Second Circuit found it inconclusive, other than evidencing the desire 
to enable the Board to operate more efficiently.  Similarly, the Seventh Cir-
cuit said that, “to the extent that the legislative history points either way . . . 
it establishes that Taft-Hartley created a body that was allowed to operate in 
panels in order to work more efficiently.”58  But both courts acknowledged 
that no authoritative legislative history addressed the precise question of 
whether a two-member Board can operate. 
The majority and the dissent, along with the litigants, made competing 
arguments about the significance of the Board’s past practice about two 
members deciding cases.  Obviously, when the panel splits two to one, the 
rule is that stated by the two.  As the majority acknowledge, when one 
member of a three member panel is recused from participation or decision 
in a case, the remaining two decide the case.59  But the majority emphasized 
that in the past when one member had resigned from the Board, the Board 
had reconstituted all the three-member panels of which the departing   
member had been a part rather than permit the remaining two to decide the 
cases.60  Similarly, the majority emphasized that Board’s previous practice 
                                                                                                                           
 56 93 CONG. REC. 7523, 7525 (June 23, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1629, 
1632 (1948). 
 57 Snell Island SNF, LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 422 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 58 New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 59 New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, slip op. at 7. 
 60 Id. 
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had been for the Board not to issue decisions during the periods when its 
membership had fallen to two.61  But the dissent emphasized that the Board 
had decided nearly 500 cases during the three separate times when it had 
had only two members between 1935 and 1947.62 
D. Intent and Purpose of the NLRA 
The majority’s functional reasons for its interpretation focused the 
possibility that two members of the Board would decide policies that ought 
better be decided by a larger group. The majority rejected the Government’s 
argument that the two-member reading served an overriding Congressional 
goal of Board efficiency and the importance of keeping the agency running 
during a difficult political stalemate, asserting that Congress could fix the 
problem by amending the statute and noting, via a citation to Robert’s Rules 
of Order, that quorum requirements are “protection against totally unrepre-
sentative action in the name of the body by an unduly small number of    
persons.”63 
The dissent, by contrast, faulted the majority for rendering the agency 
“defunct.”64  The dissent began by emphasizing that the Board had been 
without a majority of the statutorily authorized members for over two years, 
a problematic situation for the agency and surely one not intended by Con-
gress.  Then the dissent offered two functional reasons to reject the        
majority’s reasoning and allow two members of the Board to operate.  The 
first, as the dissent pointed out, was the core of its disagreement with the 
majority:  which is the lesser of two evils – to allow the Board to operate 
with less than a majority of its members for a protracted period of time or to 
shut the agency down entirely?  This is really the core of the case, and it is 
the issue on which the Court offered much less than it should have in the 
way of reasons.   
The general purpose underlying quorum rules – to ensure that a deci-
sion of a group of a body is representative of the whole body – is too      
general to answer the question.  Since the majority accepted that the statute 
allows two members of the Board to act when the Board has at least three 
members, the Board has delegated its authority to a group of three, and the 
third member is not participating on account of a conflict or for another 
reason, the purpose of ensuring that the decision of the two-member group 
is representative of the views of the whole would be better served by     
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. at 7-8. 
 62 Id. at 11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 63 Id. at 13 (majority opinion). 
 64 Id. at 14 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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allowing a two-member group to act when the Board consists of only two 
because in that case the decision represents the views of 100 percent of the 
Board rather than only two-thirds of it.  Similarly, the need to keep the 
agency operating when the confirmation process fails perhaps could result 
in just one remaining member deciding cases, which might be more than 
the dissent would tolerate.  So, neither the specific legislative history, nor 
its (somewhat less specific) intent, nor its (even less specific) purpose    
answers the question whether the two-member Board can act.  Fundamen-
tally, the role of the courts when an agency’s membership falls below a   
majority is the question posed but not answered in the case, and it raises 
hard questions about the role of courts, agencies, the President, and the 
Congress in matters of governance. 
III.  THE DEFERENCE ARGUMENTS 
Neither of the Supreme Court opinions addressed a question that a 
number of the courts of appeals had considered: whether to defer to the 
Board’s own interpretation of its powers under its enabling act.  Both the 
Second Circuit and the Tenth Circuit concluded that, if the language of sec-
tion 3(b) is ambiguous on the question of the two-member Board, it would 
be appropriate for courts to defer to the Board’s interpretation of its own 
statute.65  Under the framework of Chevron v. NRDC,66 the courts found 
section 3(b) to be ambiguous (the first step of the Chevron analysis) but 
found that the Board’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and 
therefore entitled to deference (under the second step of the Chevron analy-
sis).  These two cases found Chevron deference appropriate because the 
Board has authority to interpret its enabling statute (the NLRA), the Board 
had deliberated carefully over the meaning of the statute, and the Board 
sought and agreed to be bound by the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion as 
to the statute.67  Oddly, although Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority 
opinion in New Process Steel, was the author of Chevron, he did not      
address the question of Chevron deference. 
There are good reasons for courts to defer to the agency’s interpreta-
tion of its authority under its enabling act.  The question whether to allow 
the agency to continue to function is fundamentally one of policy, and the 
NLRB may be in a better situation to understand and evaluate the pros and 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Teamsters Local Union No. 523 v. NLRB, 590 F.3d 849, 850-52 (10th Cir. 2009); Snell Island 
SNF, LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 419-24 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 66 See generally Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 67 Teamsters, 590 F.3d at 851,; Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 415-16. 
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cons of a shut-down as opposed to operation with a minority of members.68  
Moreover, although the Court has never actually held that Chevron defer-
ence applies to agency interpretations of the agency’s own jurisdiction, it 
has applied Chevron deference in several cases to disputes over the scope of 
an agency’s jurisdiction.69 
While there are reasons to conclude that Chevron deference is inap-
propriate, there are countervailing arguments for each.  First, the Board’s 
interpretation of its own authority to act was made in the first instance not 
as part of an adjudication but instead as a matter of its internal operations.70  
On the other hand, the Board has adhered to its determination in the many 
adjudications in which its authority has been challenged, so its interpreta-
tion has been developed and articulated through formal adjudication.71 
Second, whatever the merits of Chevron deference in cases in which 
an agency interprets its enabling statute in most cases involving its own 
jurisdiction, the case for Chevron deference might be most problematic 
when an agency is determining its own survival.  The employer and its ami-
ci in New Process Steel objected to the practice of only two members decid-
ing cases on the grounds that their views are not representative of those of 
the entire agency.72  On the other hand, because all four members of the 
Board decided to delegate authority to a group of three knowing that the 
authority would be exercised by only two members at the expiration of the 
recess appointments, the Board as a whole made the considered decision to 
allow members Liebman and Schaumber to keep the agency functioning.  It 
may also have mattered to them that Liebman and Schaumber were ap-
pointed by presidents of different political parties and hold divergent views 
on labor policy, so they may have made the considered policy judgment that 
it was better for the agency and the law to allow those two to keep the 
agency operating than to allow the Board to stop rendering decisions. 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Pauly v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) ([insert present participal 
phrase] Chevron acknowledges that the resolution of ambiguity is often more a question of policy than 
law and that when Congress has delegated policymaking authority to an agency, the extent of judicial 
review of policy decisions should be limited).  See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE § 3.3 (4th ed. 2002) (collecting cases on Chevron and policymaking). 
 69 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Miss. Power & Light 
Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 357 (1988); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 
(1985); see also PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5 at 157 (arguing that Chevron deference 
should apply to agency interpretations of its jurisdiction). 
 70 See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (Chevron deference applies to 
formal adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking but not to opinion letters, policy statements, 
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines because the latter “lack the force of law”). 
 71 Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 6, n.7, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 
08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010). 
 72 Brief for Petitioner New Process Steel, L.P. at 33, New Process Steel, No. 08-145; see also 
Brief for Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce at 20, New Process Steel, No. 08-1457.  
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Third, the Board explicitly relied on the advice of OLC, not solely on 
its own reading of the statute, and OLC opinions do not get Chevron defer-
ence.73  On the other hand, the Board made clear both before it sought 
OLC’s opinion and afterward that it had reached its own judgment about the 
propriety of the delegation.   
Finally, on the three occasions since 1947 when the Board’s member-
ship has fallen below three, the Board has declined to decide cases. This has 
been argued to mean that the Board’s interpretation of its powers is not   
entitled to Chevron deference because it is not a consistently held position 
of the agency.74  On the other hand, the Board may have believed in each of 
those instances that the vacancies would be brief and that labor policy 
would be best served by waiting for new members to be confirmed.  In this 
instance, by contrast, having watched President Bush fail to gain confirma-
tion for his nominees and knowing that the occupant of the White House 
was changing and that nominations might be very slow in coming, the 
Board might have decided that labor policy would be better served by con-
tinuing. 
Reasonable minds can differ on the language, legislative history and 
Chevron deference analyses.  In this case, the vast majority of judges     
rejected the majority’s reading, which makes the majority’s reliance on 
plain language particularly unpersuasive.  While it is of course true that all 
that matters in the end is that five of the nine judges on the Supreme Court 
agreed with one reading, it does a disservice to the cause of reasoned deci-
sionmaking to pretend that the language, history, or purpose of the statute 
decide the case when the majority of judges who considered the very argu-
ments that the majority opinion makes rejected them.   
What the decision reflects is the dominance of the highly formalist 
style of legal reasoning that treats issues as if they were resolvable based 
solely on a close reading of the text of a statute or the Constitution when 
what really divides the judges are underlying issues about substantive poli-
cy or separation of powers.  This divide between the formalism of putative-
ly textual or originalist modes of statutory and constitutional interpretation 
and functionalist modes appeared in other cases this Term, particularly Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, in which 
five justices, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, struck down a provi-
sion of the accounting reforms instituted by Sarbanes-Oxley.75  The majority 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Brief for the National Labor Relations Board, supra note 71 at 4-5. 
 74 Brief for Petitioner New Process Steel, LP, at 5, New Process Steel, No. 08-1457; Brief for 
Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce at 15, New Process Steel, No. 08-1457. 
 75 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 08-861, slip op. at 33-34 (U.S. 
June 28, 2010).  
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held that the provision allowing the Securities Exchange Commission to 
remove members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board only 
for cause violated separation of powers because it deprived the President of 
the power to remove them at will.  Justice Breyer, joined in his dissent by 
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, faulted the majority for, among 
other things, adopting a reading of Executive power that ignores the practi-
cal realities of the administrative state and called for a functional approach 
to addressing the powers of independent agencies and commissions.76 
There are a number of parallels between the result and reasoning in 
New Process Steel and Free Enterprise Fund.  First, the conservative     
majority in both cases determined that an independent agency was unlaw-
fully constituted because of a defect in the machinery of the appointments 
of its five members.  Although in New Process Steel the source of the defect 
was statutory and in Free Enterprise Fund the problem was constitutional, 
in both cases the conservative majority held that the agency could not 
properly operate.  Second, in both cases the majority reasoned to the result 
by relying on a formalist style of reasoning that purported to be commanded 
by the text of the statute or the constitution, rejecting the dissent’s argument 
that the majority’s interpretation would wreak havoc with the sensible oper-
ation of the administrative state.  And, third, in both cases the majority’s 
decision raised but did not address a host of difficult issues about its scope 
and the possible invalidity of a number of agency actions, thus leaving the 
lawyers for the affected government agencies with a daunting task of figur-
ing out implications of the decision.  In both cases, the dissent insisted that 
greater weight should be given to practical considerations such as the need 
for agencies to function in an imperfect world, and in both cases the call for 
functionalism garnered only four votes. 
IV.  FUNCTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
While the problems with the confirmation process are undoubtedly po-
litical – the President and the Senate (either a majority or a minority) cannot 
resolve their differences on labor policy enough to nominate or confirm 
members that are palatable to their policy adversaries, it is too facile to say 
that the solution should be political.  Chief Justice Roberts suggested at the 
end of the oral argument in New Process Steel that the solution may be   
recess appointments, and President Obama took the hint by making two 
recess appointments just a day or two after the argument, having previously 
said he would not use recess appointments to staff the Board.  Justice     
Stevens’ majority opinion said that Congress “can easily” allow the Board 
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to operate with only two members,77 but anyone even remotely familiar 
with labor law knows that amending the NLRA is not easy.  Every single 
change to the statute has been filibustered since 1974.  Sixty-three percent 
of appointments to the NLRB since 1988 have been recess appointments.  
The problem is that recess appointments serve short terms, and it is difficult 
for the Board to decide controversial cases or to contemplate rule-making 
or other regulatory reform when its membership is constantly in flux or at 
risk of departure. 
The underlying issues raised by the New Process Steel case go to the 
heart of the administrative state.  Now that we know that Congress or the 
President can shut an agency down simply be declining to nominate or con-
firm new members, will that power be exercised?  By whom – a President 
hostile to the goals of the NLRA?  A Senate minority determined to use its 
filibuster power?  A Senate majority at odds with the President?  How does 
the recent trend toward filling the agency with recess appointments affect 
its functioning?  Was the failure of Congress to confirm nominees and the 
President to use recess appointments facilitated by the NLRB’s willingness 
to continue to operate with only two members?  Would courts help the nom-
ination process by forcing the Senate and the President to choose between 
confirming nominees and total shut-down?  Or would allowing the failure 
of the confirmation to shut the agency down give a form of heckler’s veto 
that would ultimately damage the administrative state?  To what extent is 
this problem unique to labor agencies or other highly-politicized agencies?  
To what extent has this problem gotten worse because of an increase in 
holds and filibusters?  Does the ability to block a nomination, or the refusal 
to nominate a successor, allow the Senate or the President a kind of de facto 
repeal of the enabling statute?  If so, is there anything wrong with that, or at 
least wrong enough that the courts should address it?  Full consideration of 
these issues must await another article.  What follows are some preliminary 
thoughts. 
A. Congress, the Executive and the Functioning of Agencies 
As is well known, the ordinary confirmation process for independent 
agencies is, as for the judiciary and other cabinet-level and high-level posi-
tions, presidential nomination subject to the advice and consent of the    
Senate.  When that process fails, recess appointments may be made under 
the Vacancy Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2: “The President shall have Pow-
er to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, 
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by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next      
Session.”  With respect to some agencies (not the NLRB), the Vacancies 
Act authorizes the President to direct an officer or employee of an agency to 
perform the functions and duties of an office that becomes vacant on a tem-
porary or acting basis.78  
The nomination and confirmation process has grown lengthier in      
recent decades with the result that more vacancies exist at the senior level 
in agencies.79  The length of the confirmation process and the likelihood that 
nominations will fail have been particularly great in highly politicized areas 
of law.80  This is particularly true with respect to the NLRB, where the polit-
ical stalemate over nominations has grown worse in the past thirty years.  
According to Richard Block, there were no recess appointments to the 
NLRB before 1980, but 63 percent of nominations to the Board between 
1988 and 2008 were by recess appointment.  Relatedly, no nominations to 
the Board died without action in the Senate before 1968, ten percent did not 
get through the Senate between 1968 and 1987, and over a quarter failed in 
the Senate between 1988 and 2008.81 
Much has been written lately on the Senate confirmation process, par-
ticularly as applied to judicial nominations.  Several factors are frequently 
said to account for the increase in time and rancor in the confirmation pro-
cess.  One factor is that, as the size of the federal bureaucracy has grown, 
the minority party has realized the power it can exercise by blocking nomi-
nations to government agencies.  A second factor is that the Democratic and 
Republican parties have become increasingly polarized on a number of  
issues, as moderates are scarce in both parties and cross-over votes have 
become rare on a host of issues, and labor relations is one of the issues on 
which the parties are very divided. 
Some have attributed the failure of the confirmation process to the 
contemporary tendency of the White House and the Senate to treat nomina-
tions as a “package.”82  While this is not true over the longer term of NLRB 
nominations, it is true with respect to the recent nominations by both Presi-
dent Obama and President Bush.  The 27-month vacancies was the product 
                                                                                                                           
 78 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3349d (2006). 
 79 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 913, 914, 920 (2009). 
 80 See id. at 920-21. 
 81 Susan J. McGolrick, Professor/Arbitrator Calls NLRA ‘Pretty Sick,’ Calls for Substantive, 
Procedural Fixes, 112 DAILY LABOR REPORT B-1 (2009). 
 82 Id. (attributing to former Board member, Sarah Fox, the view that the appointment process is 
designed to allow gradual change in the agency by replacing one member every year; that the “package” 
system politicizes the process by treating nominees as representing the interests of labor or management; 
and that the package system contributes to long vacancies).  
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of a stand-off between the White House and the Senate over confirmation 
of the three new members.  The Democratic Senate majority refused to con-
firm the Republican choice of member if the Republican Senate minority 
continues to filibuster the Democratic choice.  President Obama announced 
early in his term that he would not use recess appointments when the Senate 
refuses to vote on his nominees, in part because President Bush angered 
Senators by using recess appointments for seven of his nine nominees to the 
NLRB.  This stand-off is not a unique situation involving this President and 
this majority and minority in the Senate.  Toward the end of George W. 
Bush’s second term as president, the Democratic Senate majority refused to 
confirm his slate of nominees to the Board and even refused to recess to 
prevent him from  making recess appointments (not only to the NLRB but 
to other agencies as well).83 
The willingness of the Senate to block agency appointments may not 
be the same as between Democrats and Republicans.  When an agency is 
short on members, the inability of remaining members to act operates as a 
de facto elimination of the agency’s regulatory authority.  On a systemic 
basis, the failure of an agency to meet its quorum rule serves the interests of 
those resisting regulatory intervention.  As one commentator has observed, 
in the case of the FTC and its role reviewing mergers, this gives greater 
weight to a political position that favors acquisitions.84  As applied to the 
NLRB, this generally means that those who favor elimination of NLRB 
enforcement of federal labor law have less to lose by blocking nominations 
than those who support NLRB enforcement.  Generally, this means that 
Republicans will be more willing to either nominate candidates that they 
know will be extremely controversial in the Senate or to refuse to confirm 
those whom they dislike than Democrats are because Democrats are more 
likely to conclude that even a conservative, pro-management Board is better 
than no Board at all.  Moreover, as scholars have complained for decades, 
delay has an insidious effect of weakening the NLRA’s election machinery 
and unfair labor practice remedies, such that delay generally helps         
employers and harms unions and wrongfully discharged employees. 
In sum, delay or failure of the confirmation process is not likely to 
harm both labor and management equally.  Delay or agency shut-down is 
more likely to harm labor, which means delay is more likely to be a tool 
used by the interests of management. 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Edwin S. Hopson, NLRB Member Confirmation Battles – January 2001 – January 2009, 
WYATT EMPLOYMENT LAW REPORT (Feb. 15, 2010), http://wyattemployment.wordpress.com/2010/02/ 
15/nlrb-member-confirmation-battles/. 
 84 Falls, supra note 28, at 711. 
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B. The Role of Courts in Invalidating Agency Action Based on Structural 
Objections to the Agency’s Composition 
An enduring question is what role courts should play when failures of 
the nomination and confirmation process threatens to prevent an agency 
from acting at all.  The Supreme Court did not address this issue, but it is an 
important and recurring one.  There are a few instances in which the issue 
has arisen in the past, and those cases are examined below for the light they 
shed on the issues that the Supreme Court neglected in New Process Steel.   
In Assure Competitive Transportation v. United States, an organization 
of common carriers (ACT) challenged a decision of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission granting an application of a trucking company seeking 
authorization to transport general commodities in the Midwest.85  ACT  
alleged that the ICC lacked authority to act because it had only five of the 
statutory eleven members.  ACT offered evidence “tending to show that” 
the President had intentionally refused to appoint Commissioners, and 
sought invalidation of all ICC orders from June 30, 1978, when the Com-
mission’s membership fell to five, to the following year.86  The Seventh 
Circuit rejected the contention, finding that under the enabling statute a 
quorum of the ICC is a majority of the existing Commission, not a majority 
of the total authorized members.87  ACT also argued that the Commission’s 
action was unconstitutional because the president had deliberately failed to 
appoint replacements, thus violating the appointments clause (Art. II, § 2, 
cl. 2), the take care to faithfully execute the law clause (Art. II, § 3, cl. 4), 
and the separation of powers (in particular, the provision of Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
providing that Congress regulates commerce).88 
The court rejected the constitutional challenge to the power of the 
ICC, explaining that the five existing commissioners were duly appointed 
by the President with the concurrence of the Senate and were thus validly 
exercising power and that the enabling statute specifically provided that 
vacancies would not affect the power of the Commission to act.89  The court 
then continued: 
The only arguable illegality is on the part of the President, who may 
be, as alleged, intentionally or unreasonably failing to appoint a full 
complement of Commissioners.  In so withholding his power of      
appointment, ACT asserts, the President is effectively legislating a    
                                                                                                                           
 85 Assure Competitive Transp. v. United States, 629 F.2d 467, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 86 Id. at 474. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 474-75. 
 89 Id. at 475. 
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different size Commission than the eleven member Commission pre-
scribed by Congress. . . . 
We need not be detained by the complex issues that would involve us 
here were this a proper action alleging that the President was acting   
illegally and asking that he be compelled to make the requisite number 
of appointments to the Commission.  This is not a mandamus action 
where the President has been made a party defendant. . . . We express 
no opinion as to the likelihood of success of a mandamus action.90 
It’s a large understatement to characterize as “complex” the issues that 
would confront a court deciding whether it has the power to wade into the 
confirmation process and what remedy to order even if it decided that a 
failure to nominate or to confirm members to the Board were done with the 
express purpose of preventing the agency from acting. 
Even though the Court concluded that the NLRB cannot act with only 
two members, it does not follow that the NLRB’s actions since January 
2008 have become invalid.  In a past high-profile circumstance when the 
Supreme Court found that another government agency lacked the authority 
to act because of structural flaws in its composition, the Court allowed the 
agency to keep acting while Congress designed and enacted a new struc-
ture.  In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the 
Court found that the bankruptcy courts as then constituted violated Article 
III of the Constitution because they vested in non-Article III courts func-
tions that Congress could not properly vest in such courts.91  Rather than 
invalidate all the handiwork of the bankruptcy courts in the five years     
between the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act and the Court’s decision, 
however, the Court decided to apply its decision prospectively only and, 
moreover, it stayed its decision for several months to “afford Congress an 
opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid 
means of adjudication, without impairing the interim administration of the 
bankruptcy laws.”92  That is, not only did the Court hold that the cases that 
the bankruptcy courts had decided were validly decided, it also empowered 
them to continue in business for another several months  even  though  the  
Court  had  decided  that  they  were  unconstitutionally exercising power.  
At the end of the year, Congress had not fixed the problem, but the Su-
preme Court denied the government’s application to further extend the 
stay.93 
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Similarly, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held that the Federal Elections 
Commission was unconstitutionally constituted because Congress retained 
control over the appointment of some members and thus violated the sepa-
ration of powers principle that executive powers can be exercised only by 
agencies whose members are appointed by the executive.94  But the Court 
explicitly held that the unconstitutionality of its membership was not a basis 
for invalidating its past acts, and indeed stayed the Court’s decision for   
thirty days to allow Congress to reconvene the Commission in a manner 
that would meet the Court’s new separation of powers test.95 
There are a few precedents in addition to those described above        
involving circumstances when an agency was effectively prevented from 
acting because of failures to nominate or confirm members: Federal Elec-
tion Commission in 2008;96 Consumer Product Safety Commission in 
2006;97  Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission in 2004;98 
and Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission in 1987-88.99  The 
approach to each differed.  In 2008, when CPSC lost quorum, Congress 
enacted a temporary provision allowing two members of the CPSC to    
operate for six months.100  When OSHRC fell to just one member in 1987-
88, the lone remaining member had the option under the enabling statute of 
declining to review administrative law judge decisions thus allowing the 
decision to become final and the parties to see review in the courts.101 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976). 
 95 Id. 
 96 FEC, Fiscal year 2010 Congressional Justification & Performance Budget at 4 (May 7, 2009), 
available at www.fec.gov/pages/budget/fy2010/FY_2010_CJ_Bud_05_07final.pdf. 
 97 Consumer Product Safety Commission, 2009 Performance Budget Request at 8 (Feb. 2008), 
available at www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/reports/2009plan.pdf. 
 98 See Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, Justification of Appropriation Esti-
mates   for   Committee   on   Appropriations   FY  2006   at   2,   available   at   www.fmshrc.gov/plans/ 
fy06budget.pdf. 
 99 See McLaughlin v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 869 F.2d 1039, 1041-43 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 100 See 15 U.S.C. § 2053(d) (2006) (“No vacancy in the Commission shall impair the right of the 
remaining Commissioners to exercise all the powers of the Commission, but three members of the 
Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that if there are only three 
members serving on the Commission because of vacancies in the Commission, two members of the 
Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and if there are only two members 
serving on the Commission because of vacancies in the Commission, two members shall constitute a 
quorum for the six month period beginning on the date of the vacancy which caused the number of the 
Commission members to decline to two.”). 
 101 See McLaughlin, 869 F.2d at 1041-43 (rejecting the contention that OSHRC’s failure to review 
the ALJ decision denied a party of a right to full administrative review and declining to remand the case 
to the agency, which by the time of the court of appeals decision had a quorum, on the grounds that the 
public safety implications of the case – which involved an explosion at an oil refinery – made it undesir-
able to remand the case to the “fragile agency”). 
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Congress has authorized members to continue to serve on a commis-
sion until a replacement is nominated and confirmed.  For example, mem-
bers of the EEOC “continue to serve until their successors are appointed 
and qualified,”102 as do Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission.103  
Similarly, members of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission hold 
office “for a term of five years and until his successor is appointed and has 
qualified.”104  Congress has permitted agencies to temporarily fill vacancies 
with administrative law judges.
   
As noted above, however, many familiar 
with the repeated failed efforts to amend the NLRA are skeptical that even 
this fix would pass through Congress. 
One issue on which the Court probed the parties at oral argument but 
that it did not adequately discuss in its opinion is which of the NLRB’s 
functions became invalid during the period in which it had only two mem-
bers.  It is revealing that none of the parties in the Supreme Court were able 
(or at least willing) to discuss authoritatively which of the NLRB’s func-
tions would have to cease if the Board cannot act with two members (or 
when its membership falls to one).  As noted above, the majority noted in a 
footnote that its conclusion “does not cast doubt on the prior delegations of 
authority to nongroup members, such as the regional directors or the      
general counsel.”  This seems to suggest that the majority thought the dele-
gations to the regions and the general counsel were not affected by the   
vacancies.  Yet, the majority continued, “The latter implicates a separate 
question that our decision does not address,” which suggests only that the 
Court was not deciding whether those delegations were valid, and that later 
litigation would determine that issue.  Or perhaps that the delegations could 
be challenged in the District of Columbia, because the D.C. Circuit had said 
the delegations were invalid, but not in the other five circuits which had 
found all the delegations valid.105 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 102 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2006). 
 103 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). 
 104 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 105 If the validity of delegations other than to Chairman Liebman and Member Schaumber is an 
open issue, a number of questions arise besides just the obvious ones having to do with whether the 
Regional Attorneys and the General Counsel have the authority to seek injunctions under section 10.  
For example, the next time the Board falls to two, if ALJs continue to decide cases, but there is no Board 
to review the decisions, can the respondent decline to comply and, since Board decisions are not self-
enforcing, does that mean that effectively there is no enforcement? 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The core question at issue in New Process Steel v. NLRB is whether an 
agency can function when its membership falls below a majority of the 
statutorily authorized members when Congress has not clearly specified 
what should happen.  Although some enabling acts clearly provide for 
agency functioning in the absence of confirmation of new members, the 
NLRA does not.  Section 3(b) of the NLRA addresses the issue, but it does 
so ambiguously.  Its four clauses – a provision allowing delegation of au-
thority to three members, a provision stating that vacancies shall not affect 
the power of the remaining members to exercise the powers of the Board, a 
clause stating that a quorum is three members, and a clause creating an   
exception to the general quorum clause providing that a quorum of a dele-
gee group is two – leave room for argument as to whether the three-member 
quorum clause trumps the vacancy clause and the final exception, or wheth-
er the vacancy clause and the final exception trump the general three-
member quorum.    
The four justices and fifteen courts of appeals judges, as well as the 
four members of the Board, who decided the Board could keep functioning 
did so not because the language, history, or purpose of section 3(b) was 
plain, but rather because they thought it does not make functional sense to 
allow a failure of the confirmation process to operate as a kind of de facto 
deregulation.  Likewise, the five justices and three court of appeals judges 
who reached the contrary position did so because they believed that declar-
ing the Board inoperative was a less destructive outcome than allowing two 
members of a five-member agency to decide cases the next time Congress 
and the President cannot agree on nominees.  In various places, the Su-
preme Court majority and dissent alluded to the underlying functional justi-
fications for their decisions, but they did not explore or defend them.  This 
is an instance in which the formalism of statutory interpretation in adminis-
trative law not only does not explain results, it does not even adequately 
justify them.  New Process Steel represents a lost opportunity for the Court 
to discuss explicitly what role it and the courts of appeals should play in the 
administrative state when the intensely political process of agency composi-
tion, nomination, and confirmation fails.  For that, we will have to wait. 
 
